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Abstract
In response to the global nancial crisis a new policy paradigm emerged in which capital
controls and other quantitative restrictions on credit ows have become part of the stan-
dard crisis prevention policy toolkit. A new strand of theoretical literature studies the use
of capital controls in a context in which pecuniary externality justies policy interventions.
Within the same theoretical framework adopted in this literature, we show that the optimal
design of crisis prevention (ex-ante) policies depends on the e¤ectiviness of crisis manage-
ment (ex-post) policies. This interaction between ex-ante and ex-post policies gives rise
to a new rationale for the use of capital controls. Specically, we show that when ex-post
policies are e¤ective in containing crises, there is no need to intervene ex-ante with capital
controls. On the other hand, if crises management policies entail e¢ ciency costs and hence
lose e¤ectiveness, then the optimal policy mix consists of both ex-ante and ex-post interven-
tions so that crises prevention policies become desirable. In our model, the optimal policy
mix combines capital controls in tranquil times with real exchange rate support to limit its
depreciation during crises times and yields welfare gains of more than 1% in consumption
equivalence terms.
JEL Classication: E52, F37, F41
Keywords: Capital Controls, Real Exchange Rate Policy, Financial Frictions, Financial
Crises, Financial Stability, Optimal Taxation, Macro-Prudential Policies.
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1 Introduction
In response to the recent global nancial crisis and its costly aftermath, a new policy par-
adigm has emerged in which old fashioned government distortions such as capital controls
and other restrictions on credit ows are becoming part of the standard crisis prevention
policy toolkit (the so called macro-prudential policies). Even the traditionally conserva-
tive IMF changed its orthodox views on capital controls and is now advocating the use of
such measures when other tools are not available or have run their course of action see
Blanchard and Ostry (2012) and IMF (2012).
The key rationale underpinning the use of capital controls is nancial stability.1 The
nancial stability motive for capital controls is the focus of the inuential papers of Korinek
(2010) and Bianchi (2011).2 Their analysis is based on variants of a common theoretical
framework proposed by Mendoza (2002, 2010) in which the scope for policy intervention
arises because of a pecuniary externality stemming from the presence of a key relative price
in the collateral constraint faced by private agents. In this environment, prudential inter-
ventions (i.e., before a nancial crisis occurs) may be desirable because they make agents in-
ternalize the aggregate consequences of their decisions, discourage nancial excesses, reduce
the amount that agents borrow and the probability of nancial crises, thereby enhancing
welfare.3
In this paper we consider the same framework in which government intervention is
justied by the pecuniary externality, but examine the policy problem from a broader per-
spective. We study the role and the interaction of ex-ante and ex-post policy interventions
and show that the optimal design of crisis prevention (ex-ante) policies depends on the
e¤ectivness of crisis management (ex-post) policies. In our model, ex-ante interventions are
identied with capital controls while ex-post interventions take the form of real exchange
rate support policy (or price support policy).
Specically, we rst show that a price support policy in the event of a crisis (in our
1As documented by Magud, Reinhart, and Rogo¤ (2011), historically, capital controls were adopted
for fear of economic damage associated with reversal of capital ows, fear of excessive risk taking and to
contain excessive capital inows that fuel asset price bubbles.
2See also Lorenzoni (2008), Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), Jeanne and Korinek (2012, 2013) and Benigno
et al. (2013).
3Blanchard and Ostry (2012) make explicit reference to the pecuniary externality perspective when
motivating the IMFs view on the use of capital controls: "If there are external e¤ects from foreign borrowing
(think of amplied crisis risks for the country, where the risks are not internalized by the borrower), then
capital controls can act as Pigouvian taxes and constitute an optimal response at the country level, helping
agents to internalize the external e¤ects of their borrowing". As Jeanne (2012) put it, this new literature
transposes to international capital ows the closed-economy analysis of the macro-prudential policies that
aim to curb the boom-bust cycle in credit and asset prices.
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model, a support to the real exchange rate in crises times to limit its depreciation) always
welfare-dominates prudential capital controls. This is because by supporting the price of
collateral these policies can achieve an allocation in which the collateral constraint is not
binding. Contrary to what usually found in the literature on pecuniary externalities, the
average welfare gains from price support policies are quantitatively large relative to the
unregulated economy.
We then provide a new rationale for capital controls. Indeed, we show that when price
support policies are costly, so that their e¤ectiveness is reduced, capital controls become
desirable. This rationale for capital controls depends on the e¤ectiveness of ex-post policy
intervention rather than the amount that agents borrow in the unregulated economy during
tranquil times. This novel element of our analysis emphasizes the interaction between ex-
ante (normal times) and ex-post (crises times) policy interventions: when price support
policy is fully e¤ective in crises times (i.e. is able to address the pecuniary externality
distortion) there is no scope for ex-ante policy intervention. However, if the policy is
relatively ine¤ective in crises times, it is optimal to adopt capital controls during normal
times as a means to limit the occurrence of the crises, combined with price support policies
in crises times to mitigate their severity. We nd that the optimal combination of ex ante
and ex post policy intervention achieves welfare gains of 1.10% of tradable consumption
relative to the unregulated economy.
As the vehicle to convey our messages, we adopt the same model economy as in Bianchi
(2011). This is a two-sector (tradables and nontradables) small open, endowment economy
with an occasionally binding international borrowing constraint. Borrowing, denominated
in units of tradable consumption is limited by the value of current income generated from
both the tradable and nontradable sectors. When the borrowing constraint binds, the
decline in the relative price of nontradables generates a balance sheet e¤ect through the
constraint leading to a Fisherian debt-deation spiral. In this class of models, a nancial
crisis event (also labelled a Sudden Stop in capital or credit ows) occurs when the constraint
binds. Quantitatively this model has been successful in reproducing the business cycle and
the crisis dynamics properties of a typical emerging market economy.
While in this economy there is a well dened scope for government intervention because
of the pecuniary externality associated with the borrowing constraint, there are multiple
instruments or tools with which policy could be conducted. In fact, in our model, there are
three types of taxes that can be used: a tax/subsidy on debt, a tax/subsidy on tradable con-
sumption and a tax/subsidy on nontradable consumption. The tax on borrowing is usually
interpreted as a capital control, while taxes on either tradable or nontradable consumption
can be interpreted as a real exchange rate intervention because they a¤ect the relative price
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of nontradables directly.4 In our policy analysis, we consider all of them, studying their
relative e¤ectiveness in welfare terms. To conduct the policy analysis we follow a Ramsey
optimal taxation approach, assuming that the government budget is always balanced.
We rst study the Ramsey problem when capital controls are the only policy tool avail-
able and the government budget constraint is balanced through lump-sum transfers/taxes.
We nd that it is optimal to limit the amount that agents borrow in normal times while
no action is needed during crises times. (see also Korinek (2010) and Bianchi (2011)) The
reason why capital controls are optimal under these assumptions is that, in this model
environment, they cannot a¤ect in a welfare-improving manner the allocation when a crises
event occurs (i.e. when the constraint binds). Thus, in this setting, when capital controls
are the only policy tool available, the best that the government can do is to reduce the
probability that a crisis occurs. As a result, it becomes optimal to impose a tax on debt
ows during tranquil times.
Next we show that a policy of supporting the real exchange rate during crisis times, and
hence of relaxing the borrowing constraint when it binds, can achieve much higher welfare.
In fact, we show that such a policy can undo the borrowing constraint completely and, as a
result, support an equilibrium in which agents behave as if they were in the unconstrained
allocation. Importantly, as we shall see, this policy is also time-consistent. This result
hinges on the ability by the Ramsey planner to manipulate the value of collateral without
creating other distortions, since intervention is nanced through lump-sum transfers or
taxes and does not entail further distortions.
Finally, we show that, when lump-sum transfers/taxes are no longer available, the e¤ec-
tiveness of price support policies is reduced and capital controls in normal times complement
real exchange rate policies in crises times under the optimal policy. The interaction be-
tween ex-ante (pre-crisis) and ex-post (during crisis) policies gives rise to a new rationale
for the use of capital controls along with price support policies when both are available.
When ex-post policies are e¤ective (they can relax the borrowing constraint), there is no
need to engage in ex-ante policy interventions. But when the use of ex-post policies entails
e¢ ciency losses, then ex-ante policy intervention is required to limit the probability that
a crisis might occur. As we shall see, our rationale for ex-ante policy intervention is not
related to the amount that agents borrow in the unregulated economy.
The paper relates to a few other recent contributions in the literature on pecuniary
externalities. Benigno et al. (2012) solve numerically for the Markov Perfect optimal
4The interpretation of the relative price of nontradables as the real exchange rate is standard in the
literature. See for instance Bianchi (2011), Caballero and Lorenzoni (2009), Mendoza (2002), Korinek
(2010), Jeanne (2012). Alternatively, the consumption taxes (subsidies) could be interpreted literally as
domestic scal policy tools.
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policy problem in the context of a production version of our economy in which a time-
consistency issue arises. Jeanne and Korinek (2013) study the time-consistent mix of ex-
ante macroprudential regulation and ex-post bailout transfer in a three-period framework.
Benigno et al. (2013) analyze the extent to which private agents overborrow or underborrow
in a production version of our economy. Our paper also shares the emphasis on price support
policies in terms of limiting the depreciation of the real exchange rate during crisis times
with the work of Chang, Cespedes and Velasco (2012), who examine the role of other
unconventional policy tools such as credit policies and direct interventions in the foreign
exchange market. While they study more realistic forms of government intervention, they do
not compute optimal policy but rather focus on the transmission mechanism of alternative
policy tools.5
Other new theoretical approaches rationalized the adoption of capital controls. One
approach motivates the use of capital controls with the possibility of manipulating the
intertemporal terms of trade conceptually analogous to the use of tari¤s to manipulate
the goods terms of trade (Costinot, Lorenzoni and Werning (2014) and De Paoli and
Lipinska (2013)). Other approaches focus on the role of capital controls when there are
multiple distortions. For istance, Brunnermeir and Sannikov (2014) show that restrictions
to capital ows can be welfare improving in an economy with multiple goods, incomplete
nancial markets and ine¢ cient production. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) examine the
role of capital controls in an economy with downward nominal wage rigidity and a xed
exchange rate regime, while Fahri and Werning (2012) study capital controls as a way to
address the impossibility to simultaneously have an open capital account, a xed exchange
regime, and an independent monetary policy (as known as the "impossible trilemma").
Finally, Devereux and Yetman (2013) analyze capital controls as a way to restore monetary
policy e¤ectiveness when the nominal interest rate reaches the zero lower bound in a global
liquidity trap context.
More generally, the role of alternative policy tools is related to the work by Correia,
Nicolini and Teles (2008) in which the role of price stickiness for the design of monetary
policy depends on the existence of alternative scal policy tools. Finally, our paper relates
to the important literature that analyze nancial frictions in innite horizon macroeconomic
models from a positive perspective as in the seminal contributions of Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and, more
recently, Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013), Curdia and Woodford (2010), Gertler and
5In an optimizing neoclassical framework without credit frictions, Calvo, Reinhart and Vegh (1995) also
analyze the role of real exchange rate targeting as a temporary stabilization policy.
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Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) and Iacoviello (2005).
In terms of the solution techniques, in addition to Benigno et al. (2012), our paper
is related to Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2009), Kim, Kim, and Kollman (2008) and
Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2013): the main di¤erence being that the algorithm that we use
does not require that the policy functions are di¤erentiable (which in general would not
hold in our environment due to the occasionally-binding constraint) but only that they are
continuous.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model environment,
the scope for government intervention, and the alternative government instruments that we
consider. Section 3 studies optimal capital control policy. Section 4 analyzes the optimal
policy problem with real exchange rate management. Section 5 considers the case in which
lump-sum transfers/taxes are not available and the joint use of capital controls and real
exchange rate policies. Section 6 relates the main results of the paper to countriess expe-
rience with capital controls and price support policies. Section 7 concludes. The numerical
solution methods we use as well as other technical material are reported in appendix.
2 The model environment
In this section we describe our model economy by presenting its structure and assumptions.
Next we characterize the competitive equilibrium and the alternative equilibrium allocations
that we examine. Then we identify the externality that gives rise to scope for government
intervention. Finally, we present and discuss the alternative government policy instruments
that we will analyze in the rest of the paper.
We consider a small open economy in which there is a continuum of households j 2 [0; 1]
that maximize the utility function
U j  E0
1X
t=0

tu
 
Cjt
	
; (1)
with Cjt denoting the consumption basket for an individual j at time t and  the subjective
discount factor. E0 denotes the conditional expectation at time 0: We assume that the
period utility function is isoelastic:
u
 
Cjt
  1
1  
 
Cjt
1 
:
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The consumption basket, Ct, is a CES aggregate of tradable and nontradable goods:6
Ct 
h
!
1

 
CTt
 1
 + (1  !) 1  CNt  1 i  1 : (2)
The parameter  is the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between consumption of
tradable and nontradable goods, while ! is the relative weight of the two goods in the
utility function.
We normalize the price of tradable goods to 1 and denote the relative price of the
nontradable goods with PN . The aggregate price index is then given by
Pt =
h
! + (1  !)  PNt 1 i 11  :
Here we note that there is a one-to-one link between the aggregate price index P and the
relative price PN .
Households maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, which is expressed in
units of tradable consumption, and a borrowing constraint. The asset menu includes only
a one-period bond denominated in units of tradable consumption.
Each household has two stochastic endowment streams of tradable and non-tradable
output, fY Tt g and fY Nt g. For simplicity, we assume that both fY Tt g and fY Nt g are Markov
processes with nite, strictly positive support. Therefore the current state of the economy
can be completely characterized by the triplet fBt; Y Tt ; Y Nt g. The budget constraint each
household faces is
CTt + P
N
t C
N
t +Bt+1 = Y
T
t + P
N
t Y
N
t + (1 + r)Bt; (3)
where Bt+1 denotes the bond holding at the end of period t, and (1 + r) is the given world
gross interest rate.
Access to international nancial markets is not only incomplete but also imperfect in
the sense that we assume that the amount that each individual can borrow internationally
is limited by a multiple of his current total income:
Bt+1 >  1  


Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t

: (4)
One interpretation for the international borrowing constraint (4) relates it to the presence
of liquidity constraints. By this interpretation, lenders require households to nance a
6We omit the subscript j to simplify notation, but it is understood that all choices are made at the
individual level.
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fraction  of their current expenses out of current income, which includes consumption,
debt repayments and taxes (see Mendoza (2002) for this interpretation)

 
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t
  CTt + PNt CNt   (1 + r)Bt: (5)
By combining (5) with (3) we obtain (4). Another justication of this borrowing limit is
provided by Bianchi (2011), who appeals to an environment in which the borrower engages
in fraud activities in the period in which the debt is contracted and prevents creditors from
seizing any future income.
At the empirical level, a specication in terms of current income is consistent with
evidence on the determinants of access to credit markets (e.g., Jappelli 1990, Jappelli and
Pagano, 1989) and lending criteria and guidelines used in mortgage and consumer nancing
as emphasized by Mendoza (2002). The assumption that nontradable goods are part of the
collateral constraint is consistent with the evidence presented in Tornell and Westermann
(2005) where external credit fuels credit booms in the nontradable sectors.
The key feature of the international borrowing constraint (4) is that it captures currency
mismatches in the balance sheet of our small open economy model see Krugman (1999).
In fact borrowing is denominated in units of tradable consumption, while both the tradable
and the nontradable endowment can be pledged as collateral. Indeed, currency mismatches
have been one of the main vulnerability of emerging market economies in the numerous
nancial crises in the 1990s and the 2000s See Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2004, 2012)
and Shin (2013) for a discussion.7
From a model perspective, a crisis occurs when the constraint binds; an event that is
endogenous in the model. Yet the long-run business cycle features of the economy are only
marginally a¤ected by the crises events (Mendoza, 2010). A unique feature of the model
environment, therefore, is to nest endogenous crises dynamics with nancial amplication
triggered by small exogenous disturbances within regular business cycles.
In our small open economy, the motive for borrowing arises from the assumption that
 (1 + r) < 1 so that agents are impatient compared to foreign lender. This assumption
implies that their debt position will converge towards the natural debt limit, dened as
level of debt Bn at which tradable consumption CTt equals zero, in the deterministic steady
state of the model.8 In our stochastic environment agents engage in precautionary saving
behavior so that the probability of hitting the natural debt limit is zero.
We also assume that in our economy there is a lower bound on debt which is strictly
7Shin (2013) emphasizes the role of dollar o¤shore borrowing by non nancial rms in emerging market
economies, as dollar funding costs were kept particularly low by the US monetary policy.
8In our model, this level equals (minus) the annuity value of the lowest tradable endowment value.
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greater than the natural debt limit, B > Bn, such that Bt > B, for all t.9 This lower bound
guarantees that the competitive equilibrium allocation without government intervention and
without the international borrowing constraint (4) (i.e. the unconstrained allocation) is well
dened. In particular, it guarantees that this equilibrium has an ergodic distribution of debt
with nite support, and both tradable and nontradable consumption have a strictly positive
lower bound, while the nontradable price also has nite support with strictly positive lower
bound. Finally, in order to focus on non-trivial policies, we also assume that, given Y Tt and
Y Nt , when Bt = B, the competitive equilibrium allocation always violates the borrowing
constraint (4).10
Our calibration and in particular the assumption that tradable and nontradable goods
are complement ( < 1) allows us to rule out the possibility of multiple equilibria (see also
the discussion of Jeanne and Korinek (2012)).11
2.1 Competitive equilibrium
Consider rst the competitive equilibrium of the model above without any government
intervention. When there is no government intervention, households maximize (1) subject
9If CT and CN are strong substitutes, this constraint may bind; since the evidence is that CT and CN
are complements, we can ignore this possibility.
10This restriction amounts to a lower bound on .
11The borrowing constraint can induce multiple equilibria due to the possibility of self-fullling decline
in the relative price of nontradables that reduce the value of the collateral and the consumption of tradable
goods in a manner compatible with the initial decline in the relative price of nontradables. More formally
by combining the borrowing constraint (4), the budget constraint (3) and the pricing equation we obtain:
CTt = Bt(1 + r) +

1 +
1  

24Y Tt + (1  !) 1  CNt   1
!
1

 
CTt
  1
35  f  CTt  :
When the elasticity of intratemporal substitution is less than 1 (the goods are complement) then a su¢ cient
condition for unicity is that the derivative of the RHS (f
0  
CT

) of the previous equation with respect to CT
evaluated at the intersection point with the LHS is greater than 1. Indeed when Bt(1+r)+

1 + 1 

Y Tt <
0 and  < 1; we have that lim
CT!0
f
0
(CT ) = 0 and lim
CT!1
f
0
(CT ) = 1. This assumption combined with
the assumption that f
0  
CT

> 1 evaluated at the intersection point, guarantees that there is only one
intersection between the RHS and the LHS.
Another issue that might arise given the specication of the borrowing constraint is the possibility that,
when the amount that the planner borrows increases, then the relative price of nontradable rises the value
of the collateral by more than the increase in Bt+1 leading to a relaxation of the borrowing constraint. Our
calibration rules out the possibility of such a perverse dynamic.
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to (3) and (4) by choosing CNt ; C
T
t and Bt+1. The Lagrangian of this problem is
L = E0
1X
t=0
t
"
1
1 C
1 
t + t

Bt+1 +
1 


Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t

+
t
 
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t  Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt   CTt   PNt CNt

;
#
with t and t denoting the multipliers on the borrowing constraint and the budget con-
straint, respectively. The rst order conditions of this problem are:
CT : u
0(Ct)CCT = t; (6)
CN : u
0(Ct)CCN = tP
N
t ; (7)
Bt+1 : t = t +  (1 + r)Et

t+1

: (8)
t

Bt+1 +
1  


Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t

= 0 (9)
Combining (6) and (7) we have:
(1  !) 1  CNt   1
!
1
 (CTt )
  1

= PNt : (10)
The competitive equilibrium allocation of the economy can now be characterized by the
rst order conditions (8), (9) and (10) and the goods market equilibrium conditions:
CTt = Y
T
t  Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt; (11)
and
CNt = Y
N
t : (12)
The properties of the competitive equilibrium of this economy are well known (see
Mendoza (2002), Korinek (2010) and Bianchi (2011)). But it is important to note here
that, as Bianchi (2011) showed, this very same model can quantitatively account relatively
well for some of the key business cycles statistics as well as the incidence and severity of
nancial crises in the data of a typical emerging market economy like Argentina.
2.1.1 Unconstrained Equilibrium
As we shall see below, two of the government policy instruments that we consider, when
used optimally, can completely remove the e¤ects of the constraint (4) and achieve an allo-
cation that is identical to the competitive equilibrium of the model without the borrowing
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constraint (4). We now characterize this allocation that we refer as the "unconstrained
equilibrium" (UE).12
In terms of equilibrium conditions, the unconstrained allocation is characterized by the
following equations:
CT : u
0(CUEt )C
UE
CT = 
UE
t ; (13)
CN : u
0(CUEt )C
UE
CN = 
UE
t
 
PNt
UE
; (14)
Bt+1 : 
UE
t =  (1 + r)Et

UEt+1

; (15)
along with the goods market equilibrium conditions (11) and (12).13 We also note here
that our unconstrained equilibrium characterizes an allocation in which nancial markets
are incomplete so that there are ine¢ cient variations in consumption due to the lack of
state contingent debt.
2.2 Pecuniary externality
In order to understand the rationale for policy intervention in our model, we follow the
recent related literature e.g., Lorenzoni (2008), Korinek (2010) and Bianchi (2011) by
focusing on a benevolent social planner problem with restricted planning abilities. In par-
ticular, we assume that the social planner can directly choose the level of debt subject to
the credit constraint and allows goods markets to clear competitively. Unlike the repre-
sentative agent in the competitive equilibrium of the model, the social planner internalizes
the e¤ects of his/her borrowing decisions on the equilibrium relative price of nontradables.
This is relevant in our set up because, when the constraint binds, agentsborrowing ca-
pacity depends on the value of the collateral, which in turn is determined endogenously by
the equilibrium relative price of nontradables. We now examine the social planner problem
before focusing our analysis to the Ramsey problem.
2.2.1 Social planning problem
Specically, the benevolent social planner maximizes (1) subject to the same borrowing
constraint (4) that private agents face and the market clearing conditions for tradables and
nontradables goods (11) and (12).
12As we discussed above, the existence of a lower bound on debt which is strictly greater than the
natural debt limit guarantees that the competitive allocation without borrowing constraint has an ergodic
distribution of debt with nite support under the assumption that (1 + r) < 1:
13See Mendoza (2002) for a comparison between the constrained and the unconstrained competitive
equilibrium of the model.
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In specifying this problem, the equilibrium price of nontradables is determined com-
petitively according to the pricing rule (10) that serves also as a constraint to the plan-
ning problem.14 By substituting the relative price of nontradables, PNt in the borrowing
constraint (4) with the competitive pricing rule (10) we can write the Lagrangian of the
planning problem as
L = E0
1X
t=0
t
264
1
1  (Ct)
1  + SP1;t
 
Y Tt  Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt   CTt

+
+SP2;t
 
Y Nt   CNt

+ SPt
 
Bt+1 +
1 

"
Y Tt +

(1 !)(CTt )
!Y Nt
 1

Y N
#! 375 ;
where SP1;t ; 
SP
2;t and 
SP
t denote the multipliers with superscript SP to distinguish them
from the multipliers in the competitive equilibrium allocation and the unconstrained equi-
librium. The planner must choose the optimal path for CTt ; C
N
t and Bt+1; and the rst
order conditions for its problem are:
CT : u
0(CSPt )C
SP
CT + 
SP
t 
SP
t = 
SP
1;t ; (16)
CN : u
0(CSPt )C
SP
CN = 
SP
2;t ; (17)
Bt+1 : 
SP
1;t = 
SP
t +  (1 + r)Et

SP1;t+1

: (18)
SPt

BSPt+1 +
1  


Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t

= 0 (19)
where SPt  1  @P
N
t
@CTt
Y Nt =
1 

1

(1 !)
!

(1 !)(CTt )
!
 1

 1  
Y Nt
 1
 :
The key di¤erence between the planning allocation and the competitive one follows from
examining equations (16) and (6). From the perspective of the planner, who internalizes the
consequences of her/his decisions on PNt , when the constraint binds (
SP
t > 0), there is an
additional marginal benet in consuming an extra unit tradable consumption, represented
by the term SPt t, which captures the increase in the price of non-tradable goods associ-
ated with the marginal increase in tradable consumption. As we shall see, this di¤erence
between the margin of the competitive equilibrium and the one of the social planner has
intertemporal implications and a¤ects agents behavior also when the constraint does not
14This formulation is referred to as "constrained-e¢ cient" planning problem. A second possibility, some-
times referred to as the "conditionally-e¢ cient" problem, is to determine this relative market price by
imposing as a constraint the competitive equilibrium policy function (in our case PNt = f
CE(Bt; Y
N
t ; Y
T
t )).
In the case of the our endowment economy, these two denitions give exactly the same results and do not
a¤ect the normative analysis. See Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Lorenzoni (2008) for more details and a
discussion.
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bind.
We solve the competitive equilibrium of the model and the social planner equilibrium
(and for comparability also the unconstrained equilibrium) with global solution methods
that we describe in appendix. For illustrative purposes, the parameter values of the model
are exactly as in Bianchi (2011), and a summary table is also reported in appendix.
To illustrate the consequences of the presence of the borrowing constraint and the re-
sulting pecuniary externality, Figure 1 compares the policy functions of the endogenous
variables (CTt ; Bt+1; P
N
t ) for one negative standard deviation shocks for three allocations:
the competitive equilibrium (CE), the social planning problem (SP) and the unconstrained
equilibrium (UE).15 The gure shows the substantial di¤erence between the policy func-
tions of the unconstrained equilibrium (the UE) and the constrained ones (the CE and
SP). In particular the unconstrained equilibrium features a much higher level of tradable
consumption and debt, as well as a higher relative price of nontradable goods, compared to
the CE and SP allocations. In the absence of the borrowing constraint, agents can borrow
freely from international capital markets and sustain a much higher level of consumption
for any given stock of existing debt. In contrast, the competitive and the social planner
allocations are relatively close: they diverge slightly in the region in which the constraint is
not binding but is expected to bind in the future, and otherwise coincide including in the
region in which the constraint binds.
In the constrained allocations (in the CE and the SP), in the region in which the con-
straint binds (i.e., when there is a crisis), both consumption of tradables and the relative
price of nontradables fall sharply.16 This decline is the consequence of the so-called "Fish-
erian deation" or re sale mechanism emphasized in the nancial crisis literature. When
the amount that agents borrow is constrained, consumption is lower relative to the desired
amount in the unconstrained equilibrium. Lower tradable consumption is accompanied by
a decline in relative price of nontradables that reduces the value of the collateral, tightening
agentsborrowing capacity and reducing further consumption of tradables. This feedback
loop results in even lower relative price of nontradables and consumption. However, when
the constraint binds for a given state

Bt; Y
N
t ; Y
T
t
	
, the CE and the SP allocations coincide.
For a given amount of debt, tradable consumption will be the same in the two allocations
since it is constrained by the borrowing limit; also the resulting equilibrium price is equal-
ized since the consumption on nontradables is determined by its endowment.17
15A policy function is the non-linear equilibrium relation between the endogenous variables of the model
and its exogenous and endogenous state variables (in our case, the triplet

Bt; Y
N
t ; Y
T
t
	
).
16In the gure, the binding region starts in correspondence of the kink in the policy functions.
17Recall that the relative price of nontradables is proportional to the ratio of tradable consumption over
nontradable consumption.
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As emphasized by Lorenzoni (2008), Korinek (2010) and Bianchi (2011), when the con-
straint does not bind (i.e. in normal times) but is expected to bind in the future with some
positive probability, agents in the competitive equilibrium consume more than in the social
planner allocation. This di¤erence arises because the planner takes into account the addi-
tional marginal benet of reducing consumption today, captured by the term Et
 
SPt+1
SP
t+1

that represents the marginal benet of consuming more when the constraint binds in the
future.
2.3 Alternative policy instruments
While in this economy there is a well dened scope for government intervention, there is a
variety of instruments or tools with which policy could be conducted. In fact, in the context
of our model economy, there are three types of taxes that can be used: a tax/subsidy on
debt, a tax/subsidy on tradable consumption and a tax/subsidy on nontradable consump-
tion. In our policy analysis, in the rest of the paper, we are going to consider all of them,
studying their relative e¤ectiveness in welfare terms as well as their joint use.
To conduct the policy analysis we take a Ramsey optimal taxation approach, assuming
that the government budget is always balanced. For given policy instrument(s), the Ramsey
planner maximizes householdsutility function subject to the resources constraints and the
private agentsrst order conditions.
Tax on borrowing The rst policy tool that we examine is a tax Bt (< 0) or a subsidy
(> 0) on one-period debt issued at time t, Bt+1. This instrument is usually referred to as
a capital control policy.18 Since we allow for lump-sum transfers/taxation, the government
budget constraint is:
Tt = 
B
t Bt+1; (20)
where Tt denotes the lump sum transfer or tax. Because of this tax the households budget
constraint in the competitive equilibrium of the model becomes
CTt + P
N
t C
N
t = Y
T
t + P
N
t Y
N
t + Tt  Bt+1(1 + Bt ) + (1 + r)Bt: (21)
In the case of taxation on borrowing, our liquidity constraint now becomes

 
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t
  CTt + (1 + Nt )PNt CNt   (1 + r)Bt + Tt; (22)
18A recent example of the active use of such a tax is Brazil. See Harris and Pereira (2012) for a detailed
account of the Brazilian case.
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which combined with the individual and the government budget constraint will determine
the same international borrowing constraint as before.so that the access to international
nancial market continues to be constrained by (4).
Taxes on consumption The other policy tools that we study are a consumption tax on
non-tradable and on tradable goods. Both policy tools inuence directly equation (10) and
a¤ect the relative price of nontradable goods, PNt , which in the context of our economy
is the proxy for the real exchange rate (see for example Mendoza (2002), Caballero and
Lorenzoni (2009), Korinek (2010), Bianchi (2011), Jeanne (2012), and Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2012) for the same interpretation). In what follows we refer to these set of policy
tools as real exchange rate policyor "exchange rate policy" for brevity.
With the tax on nontradable consumption, (1+Nt ), the constraint that each household
faces becomes
CTt + P
N
t (1 + 
N
t )C
N
t = Y
T
t + P
N
t Y
N
t + Tt  Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt; (23)
where Nt > (<) 0 is a tax (or a subsidy) on nontradable consumption and Tt > (<) 0 is a
government lump-sum transfer (or tax). As in the case of capital controls, we assume that
the government runs a balanced budget period by period:
Tt = 
N
t P
N
t C
N
t : (24)
Again, nothing else changes compared to the environment that we described above: in
particular we continue to assume that international nancial market access is constrained
by (4). Indeed, our liquidity constraint now becomes

 
Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t
  CTt + (1 + Nt )PNt CNt   (1 + r)Bt + Tt; (25)
which combined with the individual and the government budget constraint will determine
the same international borrowing constraint as before.
With a tax on tradable consumption as the governments policy tool, each household
now faces the following budget constraint:
(1 + Tt )C
T
t + P
T
t C
N
t = Y
T
t + P
N
t Y
N
t + Tt  Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt: (26)
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The government budget constraint continues to be balanced:
Tt = 
T
t C
T
t ; (27)
and the borrowing constraint remains as in (4).
3 Capital controls
We now study the optimal policy problem when the policy tool is given by Bt . The Ramsey
problem for Bt is to choose a competitive equilibrium that maximizes (1). More formally:
Denition 1. For a given fB0g and assuming that fY Tt g and fY Nt g are Markov processes
with nite, strictly positive support, the Ramsey problem for Bt is to choose a competitive
equilibrium that maximizes
U j  E0
1X
t=0

tu (Ct)
	
;
subject to the resource constraints (11) and (12), the government budget constraint (20),
the borrowing constraint
Bt+1 >  1  


Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t

; (28)
and the rst order conditions of the household
u0(Ct)CCT (1 + 
B) = t +  (1 + r)Et [u
0(Ct+1)CCT ] ; (29)
(1  !) 1  CNt   1
!
1
 (CTt )
  1

= PNt : (30)
We can now state the following proposition, which qualies the main result of Bianchi
(2011).
Proposition 1. The Ramsey optimal policy with B as the government policy instrument
replicates the social planner allocation (SP). Moreover the optimal policy is time-consistent.
PROOF: Lets consider rst a less restricted version of the Ramsey problem in which the
planner maximizes (1) subject to (11) and (12), (28) and (30). This problem corresponds
to the social planner one (SP) dened above. The solution of the Ramsey problem for
B cannot achieve a higher welfare than the social planner allocation because the Ramsey
problem is more restricted than the social planner problem by equation (29).
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We conjecture that the two allocation coincide. To verify this, note that the Euler
equation for the social planner problem is
u0(CSPt )C
SP
CTt
+ SPt 
SP
t = 
SP
t + (1 + r)Et[u
0(CSPt+1)C
SP
CTt+1
+ SPt+1
SP
t+1]: (31)
It is easy to see that, if the Ramsey planner chooses
 
1 + Bt

in equation (29) so that
Bt = (u
0(CSPt )C
SP
CTt
) 1(SPt 
SP
t   (1 + r)Et[SPt+1SPt+1]); (32)
the Euler equations (29) and (31) become identical. It follows that the solution of the
Ramsey problem for B and the social planner problem above coincide, and the expression
(32) is the Ramsey optimal policy for Bt .
Moreover, since the optimal policy for B decentralizes the social planner problem,
which is a recursive problem that can be represented by value function iteration and only
depends on the current state (

Bt; Y
N
t ; Y
T
t
	
), the equilibrium is subgame perfect and the
policy rule (32) is time-consistent.
QED.
A few remarks are in order here. From a policy perspective, as discussed by Bianchi
(2011) and noted in the previous section, when the constraint binds (i.e. SPt > 0), the social
planner allocation coincides with the competitive equilibrium allocation, and therefore it is
optimal to set Bt = 0. When the constraint does not bind, but it can bind with positive
probability in the next period (i.e. SPt = 0, but Et[
SP
t+1
SP
t+1] > 0), the optimal state
contingent Bt is a tax on borrowing (
B
t < 0). Thus, it is optimal to engage in a policy
intervention even when the constraint does not bind but might bind in the future. In this
sense the optimal policy is prudentialor precautionaryin nature. Intuitively, since Bt
is impotent during the crisis, the best thing that policy can do, conditional on having only
the tax on debt as the government instrument, is to reduce the probability that a crisis
occurs by limiting the amount that agents borrow in equilibrium (i.e. by taxing Bt+1).
Figure 2 plots the policy function for Bt that solves the optimal policy problem above
and replicates the SP allocation, as well as the welfare gains for Bt as a function of current
bond holdings for a negative one standard deviation shocks. Figure 3 reports the ergodic
distribution of debt. Table 1 reports the ergodic mean of debt as a share of (annual) income
in units of tradable consumption, the unconditional probability of a nancial crisis, as well
as the average welfare gain associated with this policy instrument relative to the CE.19
Intuitively, when the economy approaches the binding constraint (which is where the
19See appendix for a description of the solution method and the computation of the welfare gains.
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tax rate peaks in Figure 2), the higher is the probability that the constraint binds the
higher is the tax on borrowing. Looking at the welfare gains we can see that they also peak
when the constraint binds, but reverts to zero slower than the tax rate. The welfare benet
of capital controls persists past the level of debt at which the constraint binds because
entering a crisis with less debt burden makes the crisis relatively less costly. In fact, as
we can see from Figure 3 and Table 1, the policy intervention decreases the likelihood of
crises events and reduces the average debt/income ratio, implying that the economy, on
average, will borrow less under the optimal capital control policy than in the competitive
equilibrium and will experience fewer and less costly nancial crises (see Figure 8 below
and its discussion on the latter point).
4 Real exchange rate policy
We now consider the use of consumption taxes or equivalently real exchange rate inter-
vention. We rst examine the nontradable consumption tax. As we shall see, the tax on
tradable goods is equivalent to the tax on non-tradable goods when used optimally.
4.1 Nontradable tax
As before we rst dene the Ramsey problem when Nt is the policy instrument.
Denition 2. For a given fB0g and assuming that fY Tt g and fY Nt g are Markov processes
with nite, strictly positive support, the Ramsey problem for Nt is to choose a competitive
equilibrium that maximizes
U j  E0
1X
t=0

tu (Cj)
	
;
subject to the resource constraints (11) and (12), the government budget constraint (24),
the borrowing constraint
Bt+1 >  1  


Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t

: (33)
and the rst order conditions of the household
u0(Ct)CCT = t +  (1 + r)Et [u
0(Ct+1)CCT ] ; (34)
(1  !) 1  CNt   1
!
1
 (CTt )
  1

= PNt (1 + 
N
t ): (35)
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It is important to note here that the non-tradable consumption tax directly a¤ects the
relative price of nontradables (i.e. the real exchange rate). In normal times (when the
constraint does not bind), or in the unconstrained competitive equilibrium, Nt is neutral
in the sense that the determination of the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods
is independent from PNt . In fact, the Euler equation and the goods market equilibrium
conditions are all that is needed to determine consumption of tradables and nontradables.
In contrast, when the constraint binds, Nt is no longer neutral because changes in P
N
t a¤ect
the value of the collateral and hence the consumption of tradable goods.
In the next proposition we show that, when used optimally, the consumption tax can
achieve the unconstrained allocation (i.e., it assures that the borrowing constraint is never
strictly binding in the equilibrium of our economy so that t = 0 for all t). Again, as in
the previous proposition, to characterize the solution of this Ramsey problem we follow
two steps. First we characterize a policy rule for Nt that decentralizes the unconstrained
competitive equilibrium. Then we will show that this competitive equilibrium is the one
chosen by the Ramsey planner above.
Proposition 2. In an economy dened by (1), (4), (23) and (24) with a tax on non-
tradable consumption Nt as the government policy instrument, there exists a policy for 
N
t
that decentralizes the unconstrained allocation. This policy is Ramsey optimal and time-
consistent.
PROOF: For a given state

Y Nt ; Y
T
t ; Bt
	
, let BUEt+1 be the next-period debt and P
N;UE
t
the current period relative price of non tradable goods in the economy dened by (1) and
(3) but without the credit constraint (4) i.e., in the unconstrained economy satisfying
(13)-(15).
Next, let P^Nt be the minimum price such that the credit constraint would be met if it
were present. Thus:
P^Nt = max
(
0; B
UE
t+1 +
1 

Y Tt
1 

Y Nt
)
:
If we set N such that P^Nt (1 + 
N
t )  PN;UEt , then the credit constraint does not bind. In
other words, let ^Nt = P
N;UE
t =P^
N
t   1, then any Nt 2 ( 1; ^Nt ] would eliminate the credit
constraint (t = 0 8t) if it were present, and the competitive equilibrium of the economy
would coincide with the unconstrained allocation, which eventually converges to the nite
support.
Now, in the economy with the credit constraint, the Ramsey planner maximizes (1)
subject to (11) and (12), (35), (33), and (34). In this problem, any policy schedule such
that Nt 2 ( 1; ^Nt ] can achieve an allocation that satises the rst order conditions (13)-
18
(15) of the unconstrained competitive equilibrium. Since Nt can a¤ect the allocation only
when the constraint binds, but it is neutral when the constraint does not bind, the Ramsey
planner can achieve at best the unconstrained allocation and the tax policy Nt 2 ( 1; ^Nt ]
is the optimal solution of the Ramsey problem. Moreover, any Nt 2 ( 1; ^Nt ] is completely
determined by the current state fBt; Y Tt ; Y Nt g and therefore it is time-consistent.
QED.
The proposition above implies that real exchange rate policy always dominates capital
control policy in welfare terms. Under this policy, it is possible to undo the constraint com-
pletely and replicate the unconstrained equilibrium. In contrast, capital controls can only
remove the distortionary e¤ects of the pecuniary externality associated with the constraint,
but not the constraint itself. As we shall see, these welfare di¤erences are quantitatively
very large.
But how does this policy work? The intuition for the result is that (35) directly links the
relative price of nontradables to the tax on nontradables. When the borrowing constraint
does not bind, this policy tool is neutral in the sense that it does not a¤ect the consumption
allocation, but only the relative price PNt . When the constraint binds, however, this tax is
no longer neutral and can be used to a¤ect the value of collateral in the borrowing constraint,
and hence also the allocation of tradable consumption. By subsidizing the consumption of
non-tradable goods, the policy increases its relative price. Crucially, when the constraint
binds, this policy supports the relative price of nontradables to counteract the debt-deation
mechanism that would otherwise lead to a decline in tradable consumption and a fall in
the relative price of nontradables. For this reason we also interpret this policy in broader
terms as a collateral price support policy, or price supportpolicy for brevity.
In equilibrium agents anticipate that policy will undo the constraint when this binds
and will behave as if the constraint does not exist (i.e. like in the unconstrained allocation).
For a given endowment of nontradable goods, the allocation with policy intervention entails
relatively higher price of nontradables during tranquil times (i.e. a relatively less depreciated
real exchange rate) and higher consumption of tradable goods. Eventually (i.e. in nite
time) our economy will hit the borrowing constraint because agents are relatively impatient.
When that happens, under the optimal policy, N will be set so that the multiplier on the
constraint is zero (i.e. the constraint is just binding).
Note also that the policy function for N is time-consistent, and hence promising to
eliminate the borrowing constraint by supporting the relative price of nontradable whenever
the constraint binds is fully credible in equilibrium.
Figure 4 plots the implied N and the associated welfare gains as a function of current
bond holdings for negative one-standard deviation shocks. The implied subsidy and the
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welfare gains are increasing in the amount that agents borrow. Optimal policy in this case
subsidizes nontradable consumption, limiting the downward pressure on the relative price
of non tradable goods. As a result, agents can borrow and consume much more in both
good and bad times (Figure 1). In this case, the probability of a crisis goes to zero, while
borrowing and consumption are much higher than in the CE or the SP. As a result, welfare
gains from this policy intervention are two orders of magnitude higher compared to the
gains from implementing the SP allocations (Table 1).
We note here that, for our calibration (which is the same as in Bianchi, 2011), agents are
very impatient and the incentive to borrow dominates the precautionary motive that tends
to reduce their borrowing. The relative strength of the impatience e¤ect implies that
even when the initial net foreign assets position is positive, agents will borrow up to the
borrowing limit so that a tax subsidy on nontradable consumption is needed to relax the
credit constraint. As the debt position worsens, the state contingent tax subsidy becomes
bigger, tending towards the lower bound of -1.
To quantify what a more realistic policy can achieve in welfare terms, we consider the
case of a x, 10 percent non tradable subsidy. Such a policy yields an average relative price
of on nontradables that is approximately 10 percent less depreciated than in the competitive
equilibrium with an average welfare gain of 0.4 percent of permanent consumption, similar
to that attained with the optimal capital control policy, which however is state contingent
tax schedule (Table 1).
4.2 Tradable tax
We now consider the last policy tool available. Dene the Ramsey problem when Tt is the
policy instrument as follows.
Denition 3. For a given fB0g and assuming that fY Tt g and fY Nt g are Markov processes
with nite, strictly positive support, the Ramsey problem for Tt is to choose a competitive
equilibrium that maximizes
U j  E0
1X
t=0

tu (Ct)
	
;
subject to the resource constraints
CTt = Y
T
t  Bt+1 + (1 + r)Bt; (36)
CNt = Y
N
t ; (37)
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the borrowing constraint
Bt+1 >  1  


Y Tt + P
N
t Y
N
t

: (38)
the government budget constraint (27) and the rst order conditions of the household
u0(Ct)CCTt
1 + Tt
= t +  (1 + r)Et
"
u0(Ct+1)CCTt+1
1 + Tt+1
#
: (39)
with
(1  !) 1  CNt   1
!
1
 (CTt )
  1

=
PNt
1 + Tt
: (40)
The tax on tradable consumption a¤ects not only the intratemporal relative price in
(40), but also the intertemporal allocation of resources in (39). Despite this di¤erence,
the next proposition shows that it is possible to nd a policy for Tt that replicates the
unconstrained allocation like in the case of the nontradable consumption tax Nt .
Proposition 3. In an economy dened by (1), (3), (26) and (27) with a tax on tradable
consumption Tt as the government instrument, there exists a policy for 
T
t that decentralizes
the unconstrained allocation and is time-consistent.
PROOF: Let the optimal non-tradable consumption tax be ^Nt . In the Ramsey problem
for Tt , if we set
1
1+Tt
= 1 + Nt we can achieve the unconstrained allocation, and t  0
8t: However, since Tt a¤ects also the intertemporal allocation of resources (39) we need to
show that there is a constant Tt such that the intertemporal margin is not a¤ected.
To do so, we rst note that, by imposing t  0 and setting Tt so that
1
1 + Tt
=
(1 + r)Et
"
u0(CUNt+1 )C
UN
CTt+1
1+Tt+1
#
Et[u0(CUNt+1 )C
UN
CTt+1
]
; (41)
the Euler equations of the Ramsey problem and the unconstrained equilibrium coincide. It
follows that the tax rate Tt that satises (41) must be constant (otherwise the intertemporal
margin would be distorted).
By inspection of the unconstrained allocation, the non-tradable price has a strictly
positive lower limit. Therefore there exists T (this is the lower level of the tax on tradables
compatible with the strictly positive lower limit on the relative price of nontradables) such
that the borrowing constraint (4) is always satised for any T > T . Thus, any constant
tax policy of the form Tt  T > T is an optimal policy such that the competitive
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equilibrium replicates the unconstrained equilibrium. As T is completely determined by
the current state fBt; Y Tt ; Y Nt g it is time-consistent.
QED.
While the two consumption taxes operate through the same mechanism (i.e. by increas-
ing the relative price of nontradables), one is a state contingent subsidy while the other
is a constant tax on tradable consumption. A second important di¤erence is in terms of
nancing: the subsidy on nontradable consumption requires nancing through lump sum
taxes, while the revenues from the tax on tradables will be rebated as lump sum transfer
to private agents.
5 Optimal capital controls and real exchange rate pol-
icy: the case of distortionary nancing
Our analysis in the previous section showed that real exchange rate policy dominates capital
control policy in welfare terms. Intuitively, in a debt-deation environment, optimal policy
aims at supporting prices that inuence agentsborrowing decisions. The result hinges
on the ability of the Ramsey planner to manipulate the price that enters the borrowing
constraint without costs because the subsidy on the relative price of nontradables is nanced
with lump sun taxes.
We now depart from this key assumption by considering an environment in which lump-
sum transfers/taxes are not available, so that it is costly to manipulate the relative price
of nontradables. In this more general environment, there are e¢ ciency losses due to the
use of distortionary nancing. By doing so, we characterize a situation in which managing
the real exchange rate is costly during crisis times although we dont model these costs
explicitly.
Given the structure of our endowment economy, we consider two possibilities for the
government budget constraint. The rst possibility is one in which the set of taxes is
arbitrarily restricted to Bt and 
N
t : The second possibility is one in which we use all the
taxes discussed thus far, Bt ; 
N
t ; and 
T
t .
5.1 Two distortionary instruments
In the rst case, the government budget constraint becomes:
Bt Bt+1 = 
N
t P
N
t C
N
t ; (42)
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where the budget is balanced by combining the tax on borrowing with a subsidy on non-
tradables. The following denition states the corresponding Ramsey problem.
Denition 4. For a given fB0g and assuming that fY Tt g and fY Nt g are Markov processes
with nite, strictly positive support, the Ramsey problem for Nt and 
B
t when (42) holds is
to choose a competitive equilibrium that maximizes
U j  E0
1X
t=0

tu (Cj)
	
;
subject to (11) and (12) and (33), and the rst order conditions of the households
u0(Ct)CCT (1 + 
B
t ) = t +  (1 + r)Et [u
0(Ct+1)CCT ] ; (43)
(1  !) 1  CNt   1
!
1
 (CTt )
  1

= PNt (1 + 
N
t ): (44)
As we cannot characterize the solution of this problem analytically, we must rely on
numerical simulations. To do so, we note rst that, given our chosen instruments (i.e.
Nt and 
B
t ), the problem is time consistent.
20 We then use a computational method that
exploits the Markov-Perfect nature of the equilibrium, that we have developed in Benigno
et al. (2012) and it is described in the appendix. Here we report and discuss the solution.
Figure 5 plots the policy function for Nt and 
B
t under the optimal policy and the
welfare gains in terms of tradeable consumption as a function of current bond holdings for
negative one standard deviation shocks. Figures 6 describes the policy function for Bt+1; CTt
and PNt under the optimal policy (OP, dashed line) and the competitive allocation (CE,
solid line). Again for comparison purposes, the economy is calibrated exactly as in Bianchi
(2011). Figure 7 reports the ergodic distribution of debt. In order to assess the severity of
the crisis, Figure 8 reports the ergodic distribution of total consumption growth in unit of
tradable consumption in crisis times (i.e., the change in consumption from t  1 to t, given
that the economy is in a nancial crisis in period t). For this purpose, a crisis is identied,
like in Bianchi (2011), by a constraint that binds strictly and a debt reduction larger than
one standard deviation.
From Figure 5, we can see that there is scope for both ex-ante and ex-post policy
intervention. During normal times (again, the constraint binds at a level of debt of about
20To see this, we can reduce the optimal control problem to a time-consistent static problem by considering
the restricted problem in which the Ramsey planner maximizes agentsutility subject to (11), (12), (33)
and (44). We can then solve for the allocations, the multiplier on the credit constraint and the relative
price and then use (42) and (43) to retrieve the path of taxes. In the appendix we provide an alternative
proof based on the equivalence between the commitment and the time-consistent problem.
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-.95, where the policy rules display a kink), the optimal policy requires capital controls
whose revenues are rebated in the form of subsidies to nontradable consumption; during
crises times, the optimal policy requires subsidies to non-tradable consumption to limit the
depreciation of the real exchange rate, nanced by a tax on the amount that agents borrow.
The optimal policy depends crucially on the interaction between ex-ante and ex-post
interventions. In the context of our simple economy, this interaction is a¤ected by the
way the policy interventions are nanced. When nancing is not distortionary (i.e. there
are lump-sum taxes) policies aimed at supporting the market price of collateral that af-
fect borrowing decisions are fully e¤ective and can achieve the unconstrained allocation.
In contrast, when nancing is distortionary, preventing excessive depreciation of the real
exchange rate is costly, and the optimal policy weights the marginal benet of relaxing the
borrowing constraint with the distortion introduced by capital controls. Indeed, when the
constraint binds, the tax on debt a¤ects Ct+1 through (43). Since ex-post policy is costly, it
is not fully e¤ective in addressing the distortion coming from the pecuniary externality and
it becomes optimal to intervene during normal times to reduce the probability of meeting
the international borrowing constraint. We can also see from a comparison of Figure 2 and
Figure 5 that the optimal capital control tax rate, in the region where the constraint is not
binding, is smaller than the case in which the planner can also intervene ex post.
There are two other features of the optimal policy that are noteworthy. First, under the
optimal policy, agents borrow more than in the competitive equilibrium allocation during
normal times even though optimal policy requires a tax on the amount agents borrow
(Figure 6 and 7). Intuitively, on the one hand, agents want to borrow less because their
borrowing is taxed; on the other hand, they are willing to borrow more since crises events
are mitigated (only in part in this case) by policy intervention (see Figure 8 and Table 1,
respectively). Indeed the real exchange rate depreciates less during crises times compared
to the competitive equilibrium allocation and allows agents to consume more (Figure 6).
As in the previous cases, the welfare gains from optimal policy are increasing the more
indebted is the economy. Quantitatively, the welfare gains of the optimal policy are more
than twice as large as those in which only capital controls are used (Figure 5 and Table 1).
The second important point to note is that in the economy with optimal policy there
is more borrowing and consumption than in the competitive equilibrium despite fewer and
less severe crises (see Table 1 and Figure 8). The Ramsey planner achieves this by choosing
a di¤erent relative allocation of consumption between tradable and non tradable goods,
with relatively more consumption of tradable compared to the competitive equilibrium
allocation.
In sum, in this setting a new rationale for capital controls arises in which the e¤ectiveness
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of ex-post policies determines the need for ex-ante policy intervention. As our analysis has
shown, this rationale is not related to the amount agents borrow in the unregulated economy.
5.2 Three distortionary instruments
Consider now a second possibility in which all available distortionary taxes can be combined
to balance the budget:
Bt Bt+1 = 
N
t P
N
t C
N
t + 
T
t C
T
t : (45)
In this situation, it is possible to show that there is a combination of policy tools that can
achieve the unconstrained allocation even if there are no lump sum transfers/taxes. In the
appendix, we prove that we can always combine the triplet of policy tools (Nt , 
T
t ,
B
t ) to
undo the international borrowing constraint.
The policy implication of this last exercise echoes what we emphasized earlier: the set
of instruments and their e¤ectiveness during crises times is crucial for determining the
optimal policy design. The third instrument deals with the distortions introduced by the
second in crisis times. Intuitively, it is possible to use the tax on tradable goods to undo
the e¢ ciency losses caused by the use of tax on borrowing when policy aims at supporting
the real exchange rate.
6 Discussion
Our suggested policies are not inconsistent with the experience of many emerging market
economies over the past 20 years or so.
A rst implication of our analysis is on the role of price support policies when they can
be implemented in a cost e¤ective way. In the context of our model, these policies take
the form of government interventions nanced in a lump sum manner aimed at limiting the
real exchange rate depreciation that occurs during a sudden stop in capital inows. If such
a policy is feasible, our analysis shows that it not only contains the crisis when one occurs,
but also eliminates the scope for prudential capital controls. This is because it e¤ectively
removes the borrowing constraint, which is the only source of the ine¢ ciency in our model
economy.
Our models prescriptions for price support policies is consistent with many countries
experience during the emerging market crises of the 1990s and the 2000s. In those episodes
of nancial crises, a key policy concern was the defense of the exchange rate from excessive
depreciation. For instance, the defense of the exchange rate was a crucial component of
the adjustment programs supported by the IMF in Indonesia, South Korea, and Brazil
25
during the period 1997-1999 even after the initial exit from the respective currency pegs
(IMF Independent Evaluation O¢ ce, 2003). In the specic case of Brazil, faced with the
prospect of a new nancial crisis ahead of the 2002 presidential election, "the authorities ...
responded ... proactively and ... maintained a rm monetary policy to limit the inationary
impact of the weakening Real" (IMF, 2002). To support these policies, the IMF approved a
US$30.4 Billion Stand-By arrangement in September 2002, which was the largest loan ever
to that date by the IMF to any member country.21
More recently Brazil faced another sudden halt in private capital inows following the
Lehmann collapse in September 2008. The Real depreciated by more than 20 percent in
a month and the Banco Central do Brasil intervened heavily in both the spot and repo
market for the US dollar. Mesquita and Toros (2010) emphasize the vulnerability of the
non-nancial corporate sector to the depreciation of the Real because of their exposure to
US dollar swaps (proxyed in our model with borrowing in units of tradable consumption).
A similar experience was shared by Mexico when large corporate entities were also
exposed to foreign currency derivatives at the time of Lehmann collapse in September 2008.
In their account of the Mexican experience, Chang, Cespedes and Velasco (2012) emphasize
how the response of the policy authorities consisted in intervention in the foreign exchange
market to limit the depreciation of the Mexican Peso.
More broadly, in the context of the recent US and European nancial crises, the pre-
scription of our model can be interpreted as interventions that avoid the collapse of asset
prices when a crisis occurs. In this sense, our results not only rationalizes the need to set a
oor under the exchange rate as in the emerging market crises of the 1990s and the 2000s,
but also non-conventional policies of purchases of risky assets to contain the "re sales"
and the asset deation spirals that characterized the recent United States and European
crises.22
A second main policy implication of our analysis is that, if nancial crises cannot be
contained without signicant costs, a policy of prevention becomes desirable. Indeed, in
our model, when these costs are taken into account by assuming that the nancing of price
support policies is costly, a new rationale for capital controls emerges in which capital
controls and real exchange rate policy are used in a complementary way in both normal
and crises times. When both ex ante and ex post interventions are used jointly, the optimal
capital control becomes much smaller than when it used in solation from other tools, and
21The 2002 loan turned out to be so successful that eventually was not drawn fully and was repaid well
ahead of schedule by the Brazilian authorities.
22See Bianchi (2011) for a case in which there is an isomorphism between the small open economy
environment we analyzed in this paper and a simple banking environment in which the tax on debt can be
interpreted as a domestic macro-prudential policy tool.
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yet the welfare gains achieved by their joint use with other tools are more than twice as
large.
Indeed, emerging countries have adopted a variety of policy tools to prevent the occur-
rence of nancial crises. One policy that countries have adopted over the past 20 years is the
accumulation of a very large pools of o¢ cial reserves to deploy in support of the exchange
rate in the case of sudden halt in capital inows.23 While the spectacular accumulation of
o¢ cial reserve after the emerging market crises of the 1990s and the 2000s is well known,
the simultaneous use of prudential capital controls is lesser known and more controversial.
Aizenman and Pasricha (2013), for instance, report some evidence of countercyclical use
of prudential interventions (including capital controls) during the 2000s, because of con-
cerns about net capital inows. Similarly, Federico, Vegh, and Vuletin (2012), analyze the
use and cyclical properties of reserve requirements as a macro-economic stabilization tool.
They nd that 74 percent of developing countries use reserve requirements counter-cyclically
compared to just 38 percent that have engaged in countercyclical monetary policy. They
interpret the latter nding as reecting the reluctance of many emerging market economies
to reduce interest rates in bad times for fear of letting their currency depreciate too rapidly.
Fernandez, Rebucci, Uribe (2013), however, examine the behavior of capital controls in a
large number of countries over the period 1995-2011. They nd that boom-bust episodes
in output, the current account, or the real exchange rate are associated with virtually no
movements in capital controls. They also document a near complete acyclicality of capital
controls in the run up to the recent global crisis of 2007-2009.24
We conclude from this brief review of the experience of emerging market countries over
the past 20 years of so there has been widespread use of price support policies to contain
nancial crises in emerging markets, some use of macro-prudential policies, and limited use
of prudential capital controls on transactions between non residents. Echoing Fernandez,
Rebucci, Uribe (2013), the use capital controls for prudential purposes is at best a case of
theory ahead of policy in the sense that it might emerge in the future but thus far there
has been little or no use in practice.
23Emerging markets o¢ cial reserves (excluding gold) increased from about one trillion US dollar in 2000
to over 6 trillions in 2012 according to IMF IFS data (or about a third of world GDP valued at current US
dollars). While this spectacular accumulation of reserve assets cannot be explained entirely by prudential
or precautionary motives, most empirical studies concur that precautionary saving was the most important
determinant of this process.
24The key di¤erence betwen these studies is that Aizenman and Pasricha (2013) includes also restrictions
on transactions between residents in their measure of prudential policies such as currency based measures,
while Federico, Vegh, and Vuletin (2013) focuses only on a domestic macro-prudential measures. In contrast,
Fernandez, Rebucci, Uribe (2013), look only at restrictions on capital controls strictly dened.
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7 Conclusion
In response to the recent global nancial crisis, a new policy paradigm has emerged in
which old fashioned forms of government interventions such as capital controls and other
quantitative restrictions on credit ows the so called macro-prudential policies have be-
come part of the standard policy toolkit. Arguably macro-prudential policies are desirable
because they can help prevent nancial crises that otherwise would be too costly to endure
or contain with only ex post interventions.
In this paper we analyze formally the interaction between ex post, crisis management
policies and ex ante, crisis prevention policies. We rst show that when the Ramsey planner
can choose among di¤erent policy tools, ex post price support policies dominate prudential
policy measures in welfare terms by two orders of magnitude. This dominance is conditional
on the extent to which price support policies do not entail e¢ ciency losses. Indeed, when
price support policies can be used e¤ectively, there is no need for macro prudential policies.
In contrast, when crisis management policies are not fully e¤ective because they are costly
to implement, ex-ante policies (capital controls) can be rationalized as a complement to
price support policies to limit the occurrence of crises. The joint use of capital controls and
price support policy achieves a welfare gain of 1 percent of permanent consumption; a gain
that is twice as large as the welfare gain of using only capital controls.
Our analysis is conducted in the context of a simple model, but in reality the trade-o¤s
that policymakers face are richer that the ones implied by our framework. For instance,
there are benets from a more depreciated exchange rate in terms of the classical expen-
diture switching e¤ect that are not incorporated into our analysis. To an extent, we can
interpret our model as one in which balance-sheet consideration dominates other policy
motives, but we acknowledge that a richer model would be needed to address these issues.
We regard this as an area of fruitful future research.
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A Appendix (for online publication)
A.1 Parameter values and solution methods
The parameter values of the model are set as in Bianchi (2011):
Structural parameters Values
Elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods  = :83
Intertemporal substitution and risk aversion  = 2
Credit constraint parameter  = 0:75758 1/
Relative weight of tradable and non-tradable goods ! = 0:31
Discount factor  = 0:91
Exogenous variables Values
World real interest rate r = 0:04
Steady state endowments Y N = Y T = 1
Endowment process
Autocorrelation Matrix
"
0:901 0:495
 0:453 0:225
#
Variance-Covariance Matrix
"
0:00219 0:00162
0:00162 0:00167
#
Average values in the ergodic distribution Values
Net foreign assets B =  0:91
1/ This value of  implies a value for  = :32 in Bianchis (2011) notation.
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We now describe how we compute the di¤erent equilibria. We start by rewriting the
competitive equilibrium of the model with the borrowing constraint. The competitive equi-
librium of the economy with the borrowing constraint can be summarized by the following
set of nonlinear functional equations:

 
B; Y T ; Y N

=  (1 + r)E


 
B0
 
B; Y T ; Y N

; Y T 0; Y N 0

+ max
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
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
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
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   B; Y T ; Y N ; 0	2 = B0  B; Y T ; Y N+ 1  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 
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C
 1
 
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!
1

 
CT
 
B; Y T ; Y N
 1
 + (1  !) 1  Y Nt  1 i :
In these equations, following Garcia and Zangwill (1981), we converted the complementary
slackness conditions for the borrowing constraint into a nonlinear equation.
A.1.1 The constrained and unconstrained competitive equilibrium
Given an initial guess for the marginal utility of tradable consumption tomorrow 0
 
B0; Y T 0; Y N 0

,
the set of nonlinear functional equations above can be solved at each point in the state space 
B; Y T ; Y N

to obtain an updated function 1
 
B; Y T ; Y N

. This process is then iterated
to convergence. We use a cubic spline to approximate the 0
 
B0; Y T 0; Y N 0

function at val-
ues of B0 that are not on the grid for B. We obtain the lifetime utility in the competitive
equilibrium using the following Bellman equation:
V CE
 
B; Y T ; Y N

=
1
1  C
1  + E

V CE
 
B0
 
B; Y T ; Y N

; Y T 0; Y N 0

:
The allocation corresponding to the unconstrained competitive equilibrium is computed
in a similar fashion, except that the complementary slackness condition is omitted.
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A.1.2 The social planning problem
The solution of the social planning problem solves the following standard dynamic pro-
gramming problem:
V SP
 
B; Y T ; Y N

= max
CT ;B0;PN

1
1  C
1  + E

V SP
 
B0
 
B; Y T ; Y N

; Y T 0; Y N 0

subject to
CT +B0  (1 + r)B + Y T
B0   1  

 
Y T + PNY N

PN =

1  !
!
 1


Y N
CT
  1

:
Again, we approximate the value function with a cubic spline and solve the constrained op-
timization problem using feasible sequential quadratic programming with analytical deriv-
atives.
A.1.3 Markov-Perfect optimal policy
To compute the Ramsey optimal control program with two instruments we exploit time-
consistent nature of the problem and use the method proposed by Benigno et al. (2012).
That method is related to Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2009): the main di¤erence being
that the algorithm that we use does not require that the policy functions are di¤eren-
tiable (which in general would not hold in our environment due to the occasionally-binding
constraint) but only that they are continuous.25
The optimal policy problem for N and B is also solved iteratively. The current gov-
ernment solves the following problem
V OP
 
B; Y T ; Y N

= max
N ;B ;CT ;PN ;B0;;

1
1  C
1  + E

V OP
 
B0
 
B; Y T ; Y N

; Y T 0; Y N 0

25Other methods for solving optimally policy problems with occasionally binding constraints relies on ap-
proximation techniques and as such they restrict the validity of the normative analysis to the neighborhood
of the approximation point (see for instance Kim, Kim, and Kollman (2008) or Guerrieri and Iacoviello
(2013)).
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subject to
(1 + B) = 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NY N + 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0  B; Y T ; Y N :
We then guess both the continuation value function and the future marginal utility func-
tion, solve the optimization problem using feasible sequential quadratic programming with
analytical derivatives, and then update both functions to convergence.26 Both functions are
approximated with cubic splines. Note here that smooth equilibria of the sort considered
by Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2009) do not exist in this class of models because the
policy functions are not di¤erentiable at the point where the constraint binds exactly (that
is, where 
 
B;AT

= 0 in our model).
We set a large number of grid points in the B dimension (1550), with most of them
concentrated at the lower end of the debt range where the constraint may bind. The
joint process for
 
Y T ; Y N

is approximated as a Markov chain with 49 states (7 in each
dimension) using the method of Gospodinov and Lkhagvasuren (2013), which is an extension
of the method from Rouwenhorst (1995) to vector autoregressive processes with correlated
innovations. Invariant distributions were produced using the nonstochastic method from
Young (2010), except for the frequency of crises which are estimated using a simulated
sample of 10; 000; 000 observations.
A.1.4 Welfare calculations
To compute the welfare equivalents, we solve the following functional equation:
eV CE  B; Y T ; Y N ; = 1
1  C
1  + E
heV CE  B0  B; Y T ; Y N ; Y T 0; Y N 0;i ;
where  is a proportional increment to tradable consumption, and the decision rules are
those from the competitive equilibrium. We use 200 grid points for , evenly-spaced. We
26We use analytical derivatives, particularly for the continuation value function, as numerical derivatives
produce solutions that are "choppy" for the tax variables (but not the other endogenous variables).
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then solve the following nonlinear equations for 
 
B; Y T ; Y N

:
V SP
 
B; Y T ; Y N

= eV CE  B; Y T ; Y N ; ;
to obtain the welfare gain from moving to the SP allocation;
V OP
 
B; Y T ; Y N

= eV CE  B; Y T ; Y N ; ;
to obtain the welfare gain from moving to the OP allocation; and
V UA
 
B; Y T ; Y N

= eV CE  B; Y T ; Y N ;
to obtain the welfare gain from moving to the unconstrained allocation. These equations
are solved using the Brents method, with linear interpolation between grid points for .
The Fortran code to replicate all the computations of the paper is available upon request
from the authors.
A.2 Distortionary taxation: three instruments case
Lets focus on the case in which all the distortionary policy tools are available to the policy
maker (see (45)).
Suppose that the triplet of policy tools (Nt , 
T
t ,
B
t ) can completely remove the bor-
rowing constraint (4). The Euler equation for this economy would be:
1 + Bt
1 + Tt
t = (1 + r)Et
t+1
1 + Tt+1
: (46)
Remember now that the Euler equation for the unconstrained economy is:
UEt =  (1 + r)Et

UEt+1

: (47)
By comparing (46) and (47), we can see that in order to replicate the unconstrained equi-
librium the triplet of policy tools (Nt , 
T
t ,
B
t ) must satisfy:
1 + Bt
1 + Tt
=
Et
t+1
1+Tt+1
Et

UEt+1
 : (48)
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In addition, from the government budget constraint, we need to have
Tt
 
CTt
UE
+ Nt
 
CNt
UE
+ Bt B
UE
t+1 = 0: (49)
And from the borrowing constraint, we must have that
BUEt+1   
1  


Y Tt +
 
PNt
UE
Y Nt
1 + Tt
1 + Nt

: (50)
To nd the tax policy fBt ; Tt ; Nt g that solves (48) to (50) we proceed recursively
as follows. Denote the stochastic steady state level of debt by B, and by B0 the level
of debt in the unconstrained equilibrium at which the constraint would become binding
exactly in the constrained economy. Now dene Bt = BUE(Bt 1), where BUE() is the
policy function in the unconstrained equilibrium. From this policy function, we can obtain
B0 > B1 >    > Bt > Bt+1 >    > B, so that fBkg is a debt trajectory in the
unconstrained solution starting from B0.
Starting from k = 0, for any B 2 (B1; B0], we can compute
1 + T (B)
1 + N(B)
=   B
UE(B) + 1 

Y Tt
1 

(PNt )
UE
(B)Y Nt
from (50). Lets set T0 (B)  0 in that interval and use the expression above to obtain
N0 (B). The value of 
B
0 (B) in the (B1; B0] interval can then be determined by the govern-
ment budget constraint (49).
Next, consider k = 1 and the associated interval (B2; B1]. Since we have already deter-
mined the value of T0 (B) and 
B
0 (B) for B 2 (B1; B0], by using (48), we can obtain the
value of T1 (B). Again by assuming the borrowing constraint (48) is binding exactly, we
can determine the value of N1 (B). Last, by using the government budget constraint (49)
we can determine the value of B1 (B) and update to k = 2.
By iterating recursively, we can always nd the tax policy that replicates the uncon-
strained solution in an economy with the borrowing constraint.
QED
A.3 Time consistency of optimal policy
In this appendix we prove fomally that, the Ramsey problem dened in (4) is time-
consistent.
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The Ramsey optimal policy solves the following problem:
(fBRt+1g; f
 
Nt
Rg; f Bt Rg) := arg max
(fBt+1g;fNt g;fBt g)
1X
t=0
tU(CTt ; C
N
t ); (51)
subject to conditions (11), (12), (33), (43) and (44) for all t = 0; 1;    .
The time consistent optimal policy solves the following recursive problem
(BCt+1;
 
Nt
C
;
 
Bt
C
)
:
= arg max
(Bt+1;Nt ;
B
t )
U(CTt ; C
N
t ) + V
C(Bt+1) (52)
subject to conditions (11), (12), (33), (43) and (44) at time t: Here V C() is the household
value function under the time consistent optimal policy, i.e.
V C =
1X
t=0
tU(CTCt ; C
NC
t )
where fCTCt g and fCNCt g are sequences of tradeable and nontradable consumptions based
on the time consistent optimal policy. It is important to note that the state of economy at
time t is Bt, the current level of debt. Hence, the value function depends solely on Bt. We
want to establish that, for the economy under consideration, the Ramsey optimal policy is
time consistent, i.e. BRt+1 = B
C
t+1; 
NR
t = 
NC
t ; 
BR
t = 
BC
t .
To prove this, we shall take the following steps. First, we show that this is the case in a
three-period version of these two problems. Second, we look at a four-period case and show
that this can be reduced to the 3-period case. Next we show that we can always reduce an
n-period case to a n   1-period one for any n > 4. This establishes, by induction, that in
any nite-period version of our model economy the two policy regimes coincide. Finally,
under the ausiliary assumption that the period utility function and the marginal utility of
consumption are bounded in the feasible set, we prove that Ramsey optimal policy in the
nite-period model converges to Ramsey optimal policy in a innite-horizon version of our
economy.
A.3.1 Three-period model
We start by examining the 3-period version of the original Ramsey optimal policy problem:
(fBR01 ; BR
0
2 g; fNR
0
0 ; 
NR0
1 g; fBR
0
0 ; 
BR0
1 g) :=
arg max
(fB1;B2g;fN0 ;N1 g;fB0 ;B1 g)
U(CT0 ; C
N
0 ) + U(C
T
1 ; C
N
1 ) + 
2V C(B2); (53)
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subject to (11), (12), (33), (43) and (44) for all t = 0; 1;    .
It is easy to see that the only potential source of di¤erence between the two policy
regimes comes from the Euler equation (43). In fact, when we optimizes at time t = 1 in
the time-consistent regime, we do not take into account that the choice of B2 a¤ects the
Euler equation at time t = 0;
UCT0 (1 + 
B
0 ) = 0 + (1 + r)UCT1 ;
since from (11) B2 a¤ects UCT1 .
However this can result in di¤erences between the two policy regimes only if B2 a¤ects
U(CT0 ) and U(C
T
1 ; C
N
1 ) + V
C(B2) in opposite ways. Specically, in order for the following
two problems
max
(fB1;B2g;fN0 ;N1 g;fB0 ;B1 g)
U(CT0 ; C
N
0 ) + U(C
T
1 ; C
N
1 ) + 
2V C(B2) (54)
= max
(B1;N0 ;
B
0 )
U(CT0 ; C
N
0 ) + 

max
(B2;N1 ;
B
1 )
U(CT1 ; C
N
1 ) + 
2V C(B2)

;
to coincide, it is su¢ cient that the following derivatives have the same sign:
@U0(B2)
@B2
and
@U1(B1; B2)
@B2
, (55)
where
U0(B2)
:
= max
(B1;N0 ;
B
0 )
U(CT0 ; C
N
0 );
subject to (11), (12), (33), (43) and (44) at time t = 0, and
U1(B1; B2)
:
= max
(N1 ;
B
1 )
U(CT1 ; C
N
1 ) + V
C(B2)
subject to (11), (12), (33), (43) and (44) at time t = 1.
If this restriction holds, the maximization of U1(B1; B2) with respect to B2, yields the
same optimal value of B2 that maximizes U0(B2). Therefore the maximization can be done
in a step-wise way (which gives the time consistent optimal policy) for the Ramsey program
on the left hand side of the equality (54).
Thus, in order to show that in our economy Ramsey optimal policy is time consistent we
need to establish (55). To do this, we are going to show that both U0(B2) and U1(B1; B2)
are decreasing functions of B2, given B1. In fact, it is straightforward to see that the
function U0(B2) is a decreasing function of B2, since if the household knows that in period
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2 she can borrow more, she is able to consume more in period 1, and through the Euler
equation (43), she can also consume more in period 0.
Next we want to show that U1(B1; B2) is also a decreasing function of B2, for given B1.
Let B2 be the borrowing level in the competitive equilibrium without the borrowing con-
straint or any tax intervention. So U1(B1; B2) must achieves its maximum at B2 . Therefore
U1(B1; B2) decreases for any B2  B2 . We shall show that BC2  B2 in the optimal plan
that maximize U1(B1; B2) subject to (11), (12), (33), (43) and (44) for t = 1.
We know from our optimal policy analysis on the individual tax instruments, that the
optimal policy is such that NC1  0 and BC1  0. If the borrowing constraint is not
binding, we have from the Euler equation (43) that
UCT1 (1 + 
B
1 ) = (1 + r)UCT2 :
And if B1 < 0 and the B2 < B

2 , we would have
UCT1 (1 + 
B
1 ) < UCT1 = (1 + r)UCT2 < (1 + r)UCT2 ;
which is a contradiction.27 Therefore we conclude that if the borrowing constraint is not
binding, BC2  B2 .
If the constraint is binding, from the Euler equation (43) we have that  > 0. Suppose
that B02  B2 is optimal in the economy without the borrowing constraint. We want to
show that the optimal policy in the economy with the borrowing constraint has B2  B02.
Suppose this is not the case. Then we would have
UCT1 (1 + 
B
1 )   < UCT 01 (1 + 
B
1 ) = (1 + r)UCT 02
< UCT2 ;
which again contradicts the Euler equation (43).28 Therefore we must have that BC2 
BC
0
2  B2 .
Combining the previous two arguments, it follows that U1(B1; B2) is also a decreasing
function of B and hence has the same sign of U0(B2), which proves that 55 holds.
A.3.2 Finite-period model
Let us now look rst at the case of a four-period model. We will show that this case can be
reduced to the 3-period model above. In a four-period version of our model, the Ramsey
27The rst inequality comes from CT1 > C
T
1 and the fact that UCT1 is a decreasing function of C
T
1 . The
second inequality comes from CT2 < C
T
2 and the same logic.
28The inequalities follow from the same reasonings in the case of a nonbinding borrowing constraint.
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program solves the following problem
max
(fBig3i=1;fNi g2i=0;fBi g2i=0)
U(CT0 ; C
N
0 ) + U(C
T
1 ; C
N
1 ) + 
2U(CT2 ; C
N
2 ) + 
3V C(B3);
subject to (11), (12), (33), (43) and (44) for t = 1;    ; 3.
Now note rst that
U(CT0 ; C
N
0 ) + U(C
T
1 ; C
N
1 )
is decreasing in B3 by the same reasoning as in the 3-period model, and that
U(CT2 ; C
N
2 ) + V
C(B3)
is also decreasing in B3, since B3  B3 where B3 is the competitive equilibrium borrowing
level without the borrowing constraint or tax interventions. Therefore we have that
max
(fBig3i=1;fNi g2i=0;fBi g2i=0)
U(CT0 ; C
N
0 ) + U(C
T
1 ; C
N
1 ) + 
2U(CT2 ; C
N
2 ) + 
3V C(B3)
= max
(fBig2i=1;fNi g1i=0;fBi g1i=0)
U(CT0 ; C
N
0 ) + U(C
T
1 ; C
N
1 ) + 
2V C
0
(B2);
where
V C
0
(B2) = max
B3;N2 ;
B
2
U(CT2 ; C
N
2 ) + V
C(B3)
subject to (11), (12), (33), (43) and (44) for t = 3. Thus, we reduced a four-period model
into a three-period model. It follows that the Ramsey optimal policy is time consistent in
a four-period version of our model.
By using the same method, we can always reduce an n-period model into n  1-period
model for any n > 4. By induction, therefore, we showed that the Ramsey optimal policy
for any nite-period version of our economy is time consistent.
A.3.3 Innite-horizon model
If we can establish the convergence of the Ramsey optimal policy problem for a nite-period
version of our model to an innite-period version, we will have established that Ramsey
optimal policy is time consistent for (51). To do so, we need an additional assumption, i.e.
that both U() and UCT () are bounded in the feasible set.
Dene now the following mapping T : Fb ! Fb, where Fb is the set of bounded contin-
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uous function dened on [B; 0] R+,
T (V )(B; )
:
= min
0
max
B0;B
U(CT ; CN)  (1 + r)UCT + (UCT   ) + V (B0; );
subject to (11), (12), (33), (43) and (44).
From the assumption that both U() and UCT () are bounded, it follows that  is
bounded. Following Marcet and Marimon (2011), we also conclude that T is a contrac-
tion mapping.
In addition, we note that T n(V )(B; 0) is the welfare function of a Ramsey optimal plan
for a n-period economy with V () as the nal period utility. Therefore from a standard
contraction mapping argument we have that
V () := lim
n!1
T n(V )()
is well dened and is uniformly converging. V () will be the xed point of the contraction
mapping and is the welfare function of the innite-period economy under the Ramsey
optimal policy.
By the uniform convergence of the welfare function, the nite-period Ramsey optimal
policy converges to the innite-period Ramsey optimal policy. Therefore we established
that the Ramsey optimal policy for (51)is time consistent.
QED
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Table 1: Ergodic Averages
Debt to Income Prob. of Crisis Welfare Gain
CE −29:2% 6:7% NA
SP −28:4% 1:2% 0:41%
UE NA 0:0% 33:8%
OP −30:5% 4:9% 1:10%
Notes: CE denotes the competitive equilibrium allocation; SP the social planner al-
location; UE the unconstrained equilibrium; OP the optimal policy equilibrium with
both debt tax and nontradable consumption tax. The table reports ergodic means (in
percent). Welfare gains are relative to the CE and are measured in unit of tradable
consumption.
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Notes: CE denotes the competitive equilibrium allocation; SP the social planner allocation; UE the unconstrained equilib-
rium. The figure plots the equilibium decision rules or policy functions of the endogenous variables plotted conditional on
one-standard deviation shocks. Borrowing decreases from left to right on the x-axis.
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Notes: The figure plots the optimal debt tax rate and the associated welfare gain relative to the competitive equilibium
conditional on one-standard deviation shocks. Borrowing decreases from left to right on the x-axis.
Figure 3: Optimal Capital Control Policy
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Notes: The figure plots the ergodic distribution of debt in units of tradable consumption in the competitive equilibium (CE)
and the social planner allocations (SP). Borrowing decreases from left to right on the x-axis.
Figure 4: Optimal Exchange Rate Policy
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Notes:The figure plots the optimal nontradable consumption tax rate and the associated welfare gain relative to the com-
petitive equilibium conditional on one-standard deviation shocks. Borrowing decreases from left to right on the x-axis.
Figure 5: Optimal Capital Control and Exchange Rate Policy
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Notes: The figure plots the optimal debt and nontradable consumption tax rates and the associated welfare gain relative
to the competitive equilibium, conditional on one-standard deviation shocks. Borrowing decreases from left to right on the
x-axis.
Figure 6: Optimal Capital Control and Exchange Rate Policy: Decision Rules
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Figure 7: Optimal Capital Control and Exchange Rate Policy
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Notes: The figure plots the ergodic distribution of debt in units of tradable consumption in the competitive equilibium (CE)
and the optimal policy equilibrium with both debt tax and nontradable consumption tax (OP). Borrowing decreases from
left to right on the x-axis.
Figure 8: Comparing Policy Regimes
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the period after the constraint was binding. Borrowing decreases from left to right on the x-axis.
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